Propos. 12 "for continuing Congs till a given day and for fulfilling their engagements," produced no debate.
On the question, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J.[65] ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.
[ [65] Note in Madison's writing: New Jersey omitted in printed Journal.
Propos: 13. "that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Natl Legislature", being taken up,
Mr Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity of it.
Mr Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the Govt. Nothing had yet happened in the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety.—The proposition was postponed for further consideration: the votes being, Mas: Con. N. Y. Pa Del. Ma. N. C. ay. Virga S. C. Geo. no.
Propos. 14. "requiring oath from the State officers to support National Govt" was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation: the votes. Con. N. Jersey Md Virg. S. C. Geo. ay. N. Y. Pa Del. N. C. no. Massachusetts divided.
Propos. 15. for "recommending Conventions under appointment of the people to ratify the new Constitution" &c. being taken up,
Mr Sherman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the assent of Congs and ratification of State Legislatures.
Mr Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confedn themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States, and of Congs especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.