The truth is: Soviet-bloc trading actions are neither purely economic nor purely noneconomic.

The Soviet trade offensive can be explained in terms of economic warfare, if we define economic warfare as economic action by the state that is designed to serve basic hostile objectives directed at another nation or group of nations—whether or not the immediate gains are economic.

Their Objectives Haven’t Changed

In Chapter I, the Soviet bloc’s long-term objectives in its economic relations with the free world were outlined. It was pointed out that these objectives have a dual character: strengthening the bloc and weakening the free-world powers. The objectives were summarized this way:

  1. To feed the economy, especially the industrial-military base, with imports that help the bloc become more powerful and less dependent on the free world.
  2. To drive wedges among free-world nations at every opportunity.
  3. To increase the reliance of free-world nations on the bloc for markets or supplies, and thus make the free world more vulnerable to bloc pressures.

Within this broad framework the Kremlin pursues more immediate and specific goals, such as:

The foregoing can be recognized, as among the things being attempted in the Soviet “trade offensive” of 1953-54. They did not fall in separate compartments, but were woven together in a central plan and they contributed to one another. They were not so new as some of them might look at first glance. The long-term objectives which they served were not new at all.

Their Practices Haven’t Changed