Enemy resistance was so ineffectual from 16 to 18 September that the Marine infantry regiments were able to advance without much flank protection. The three battalions of the 11th Marines did more displacing than firing in their efforts to keep pace, and men and vehicles of the Signal Battalion were kept busy at laying wire.
Security was provided for the left, or northern, Division flank by the attack of the KMC Regiment (less the 2d Battalion, left behind for police duties in Inchon) under the control of the 5th Marines. Attached to the regiment for possible use in calling down naval gunfire were two Shore Fire Control Parties. Objectives on Corps Phase Line CC were reached without much difficulty after the initial KMC setbacks described in the previous chapter.[251]
[251] Ibid., basic rpt, and Annex Queen Queen.
Marine Air Units at Kimpo
There had been little or no urgent need for close air support until 18 September, when RCT-1 met stubborn opposition in the Sosa area. Thus the capture of Kimpo in comparatively good condition was a timely boon, since it meant that land-based Marine tactical air support could be initiated as soon as Captain George W. King’s Able Company Engineers made the field operative with temporary repairs.
This was the conclusion of Generals Harris and Cushman, commanding the 1st MAW and TAC X Corps, when they visited Kimpo by helicopter on the afternoon of the 18th. They advised CG X Corps accordingly, and that evening he ordered the deployment of MAG-33 to the captured airfield with its headquarters and service squadrons.
The tactical squadrons figured in an administrative switch that has sometimes puzzled chroniclers of Marine air operations. By order of General Harris, the following reassignments were directed to take effect on 21 September 1950:
From MAG-33 to MAG-12—VMF-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513;
From MAG-12 to MAG-33—VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542.[252]
[252] CG 1st MAW speedltr, 20 Sep 50.