Colonel Puller’s tactics during the bombardment on 20 September were designed to align the 1st Marines for the actual assault of Yongdungpo, planned for the next day. It was necessary to occupy in strength all the final approaches to the town, so that the full weight of the regiment could be brought to bear against the defending garrison. From left to right, therefore, the schedule of operations on the 20th was as follows: (1) 1st Battalion to seize Hills 80 and 85; (2) 3d Battalion to remain in position on Lookout Hill; and (3) 2d Battalion to advance to the first of two highway bridges which spanned branches of the Kalchon just outside of Yongdungpo.
These limited attacks would also provide time for the 32d Infantry to catch up on the right. The day’s mission for the Army unit was to attack over a six-mile front and secure, among other objectives, towering Tongdok Mountain south of the MSR and two miles from Yongdungpo.[344]
[344] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; and 7th InfDiv OpnO 2.
Shortly after first light, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins reached the crest of Hill 118 and established his OP. He was in time to see Able and Charlie Companies repulse disconnected Red elements moving on the Marine lines from Hills 80 and 85. While the battalion commander issued his order for the attack, Major William L. Bates, Jr., commander of 1/1’s Weapons Company, set up his “supporting arms center” to cover the impending assault.[345]
[345] Though not provided for in Fleet Marine Force T/O, the “supporting arms center,” a provisional facility for coordination modeled after the regimental SAC, was a favorite with many battalion commanders in the field.
Hawkins gave Company C the mission of taking Hills 80 and 85.[346] Deciding on a southerly approach, the company commander Captain Robert P. Wray ordered his 2d Platoon to lead off by clearing a village sprawled across the route to the lower peak. Second Lieutenant John N. Guild moved out at the head of the skirmishers and led them over 500 yards of intervening low ground. Nearing a knoll which topped the clump of thatched huts, the platoon came under heavy small-arms fire and was stalled.
[346] The following narrative is taken from: Bates interv, 27 Aug 51; Barrow interv, 17 Aug 54; and Captains F. B. Carlon and J. M. McGee interv, 9 Feb 55; Hawkins ltr 21 May 55; and Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 30 May 55.
Wray immediately committed the rest of his company in a two-pronged attack which wrapped around the flanks of Guild’s line and smashed through the North Korean resistance. After a hot fire fight, the surviving Reds fled to Hill 80, and Company C occupied the village and knoll by early afternoon. The executive officer, First Lieutenant James M. McGee, led a six-man patrol eastward to clean out a small nest of holdouts, while Wray reorganized the company for the assault on the twin caps.
Charlie Company’s tactics in advancing on the enemy’s southern flank were ideal from the standpoint of Weapons and Able Companies, which supported the attack from Hill 118. The two units could actually witness the progress of the assault troops across the 1st Battalion’s front, so that mortars and machine guns at the base of fire had only to shift gradually leftward to support the Marine advance.
Late in the afternoon, Wray launched a double envelopment of Hill 80. Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey led his 3d Platoon around to the right, and Second Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st swung through the low ground on the left. A few huts concealing snipers were demolished by 3.5-inch rockets, but otherwise the Marines met little resistance as they moved over the crest of the objective early in the evening. With the first signs of darkness already in the sky, Wray lost no time in preparing for his third double envelopment of the day.