JSPOG suggested that both commands should then advance north to the line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging roughly from 50 to 100 miles below the Manchurian border. Only ROK elements would proceed beyond the restraining line, in keeping with the spirit and letter of the 27 September dispatch from JCS.[20]
[20] Ibid.
Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as CinCUNC’s chief of staff during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the JSPOG draft of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message with this reassurance:
There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces.[21]
[21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 361; Whitney, MacArthur, 397–398.
Within three days, he received word from the Joint Chiefs that they approved his plan.[22] On 2 October it became the official operation order for the attack.[23]
[22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 361; Whitney, MacArthur, 398. All dates in the narrative and in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the 30th in Tokyo.
[23] UNC Operation Order (OpnO) 2, 2 Oct 50.
Logistical Problems of Advance
On 29 September, the day before he received the JCS endorsement of his plan, General MacArthur arrived in Seoul to officiate at the ceremony restoring control of South Korea to the legal ROK government. During the visit, he met with the principals named in the Task Organization of OpnPlan 9-50: