[359] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of 95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of the day before. EUSAK PIR 136, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK WD, 25 Nov 50.
“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the EUSAK attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to be “an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong local counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by CCF or USSR forces.”[360]
[360] EUSAK PIR 137, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK WD, 26 Nov 50.
On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1 from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5 to advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to Yudam-ni.
Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate transportation had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines on 23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1 Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles, 3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.[361]
[361] 1stMar SAR, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar HD, Nov 50, 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.
All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at Hagaru, however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance in this quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th when a platoon-size patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove nearly to the northern end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups were flushed out and an abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit resulting in five Chinese killed and one captured. This was one of the few encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three battalions, and no signs of large-scale enemy activity were reported by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter reconnaissance.[362]
[362] 5thMar SAR 15–18. Smith, Notes, 626.
Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had first been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But until RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander limited the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated 150 to 200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered with the aid of air strikes and artillery support.
On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped but undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the 24th with a full, hot turkey dinner—their last full meal for 17 days—and seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible resistance.[363] The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11 (-) followed.