October-December 1950
MAP-2
The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available to the division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and no intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay firm plans along either administrative or tactical lines.[30]
[30] Ibid.
Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), issued his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force 7 (JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these missions:
1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of Chongjin.
2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as directed.
3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as required.
4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and support en route.
5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead in the Wonsan area on D-Day.