An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will probably never be made, but the following estimate is not far from the mark:
| Unit | KIA and WIA | WIA | Total Battle Casualties | Vehicles Lost[A] |
| 41st Commando | 18 | 43 | 61 | |
| Co. G, 3/1 | 8 | 40 | 48 | |
| Co. B, 1/31 | 100 | 19 | 119 | 22 |
| Div. Hq. Bn. | 25 | 25 | 50 | 18 |
| 1st Sig. Bn. | 4 | 2 | 6 | |
| 7th MT Bn. | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn | 5 | 6 | 11 | 30 |
| Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 | 12 | 12 | |
| Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 | 8 | 8 | 1 |
| Plat, AT Co., RCT-5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |
| Total | 162 | 159 | 321 | 75 |
[A] Smith, Notes, 867–868.
“The casualties of Task Force Drysdale were heavy,” commented General Smith, “but by its partial success the Task Force made a significant contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the Division. To the slender infantry garrison of Hagaru were added a tank company of about 100 men and some 300 seasoned infantrymen. The approximately 300 troops which returned to Koto-ri participated thereafter in the defense of that perimeter.”[474]
[474] Ibid. A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was written the following spring in front-page headlines announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17 enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages. Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and were liberated in Operation Big Switch.
The head of the Task Force Drysdale column, with the Company D tanks leading George Company and the Commandos, was not aware at dusk on the 29th that the convoy had been cut behind them. There had been previous gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it was supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would catch up with the vanguard.
Progress was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about 2200 yards from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged by a satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were set afire. After Drysdale was wounded the command passed to Sitter, who formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse of the Chinese permitted the march to be resumed.[475]
[475] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been derived from the following sources: 3/1 SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn SAR, 24–25; Ridge, Notes; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56.
Several pyramidal tents just outside the Hagaru perimeter were assumed to be occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity destroyed two George Company trucks and caused several casualties. Later it was learned that the tents had been originally occupied by troops of the 10th Engineer Battalion and abandoned when the Chinese attacked on the 28th.
At 1915, Captain Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who directed that George Company and the 41st Commando spend the night in perimeter reserve. After their all-day fight, the men of the column could scarcely believe their eyes when they saw the Marine engineers at work on the airstrip under the floodlights.