At the Hagaru conference the X Corps commander announced that he had abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the Chosin Reservoir area. Stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward Hamhung, he promised Smith resupply by air after authorizing him to burn or destroy all equipment which would delay his withdrawal to the seacoast.
The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by his ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out, he added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was his intention, therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.[480]
[480] Smith, Chronicle, 95. These decisions were confirmed by CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50.
Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those two generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an inconclusive note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received. It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy to the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”[481]
[481] X Corps OpnO 8, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50, 16–17; and CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps WD 30 Nov 50.
The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12 to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the three combat squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at once. Transfer of the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many instances the planes took off on combat missions from Wonsan and landed at Yonpo, so that the ground forces were not deprived of air support.[482]
[482] MAG-12 HD Nov 50, 8; 1stMAW HD Dec 50; CO MAG-12 msg to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in ibid. VMF-312 HD, Dec 50.
High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy foresaw as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth Army continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back and being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either by an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.[483]
[483] ComPhibGruOne, Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950, 1.