The 5th and 7th Marines were each acting under separate orders from the Division. The Division would issue orders to one regiment with information to the other, so that Division retained the control; and, of course, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, in general support of both regiments, was not actually under the control of either of us. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ... operated in very close coordination with me, sometimes at his own command post and sometimes at mine. We called in [Major] McReynolds, the commander of 4/11, discussed the situation with him, and thereafter Lieutenant Colonel Murray and I issued orders jointly as necessary.... This command arrangement functioned very well. There was never any particular disagreement.[503]
[503] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
For purposes of planning the supporting fires for the breakout, an artillery groupment was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Feehan given the responsibility of coordination. It was further agreed that no air drops of 155mm ammunition would be requested because of the greater number of 105mm rounds which could be received with fewer difficulties.[504]
[504] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
The problems of the two RCTs, commented General Smith, could not be separated. “The only feasible thing for them to do was pool their resources.... The assignment of command to the senior regimental commander was considered but rejected in favor of cooperation.”[505]
[505] Smith, Notes, 918–919.
At 0600 on the 30th, the two RCTs issued their Joint OpnO 1-50, which called for the regroupment of the Yudam-ni forces in a new position south of the village and astride the MSR as a first step toward a breakout.[506] Thus in effect the two RCTs and supporting troops would be exchanging an east-and-west perimeter for one pointing from north to south along the road to Hagaru. Not only was the terrain south of the village more defensible, but a smaller perimeter would serve the purpose.
[506] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: RCT 5 and RCT 7 Joint OpnO 1-50, 30 Nov 50; X Corps OpnO 8, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar SAR, 22–23; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 2/5 SAR, 20–21; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen O. P. Smith Comments, 13 Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D. Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
Lieutenant Colonel Winecoff, Assistant G-3 of the Division, flew to Yudam-ni on the 30th to observe and report on the situation. He was given a copy of Joint OpnO 1-50 for delivery to General Smith on his return to Hagaru.[507]
[507] A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an evacuation helicopter but it did not reach the Division CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments.