30 Nov 50
MAP-23
These movements freed 3/7 to re-deploy to new positions astride the MSR about 4000 yards south of Yudam-ni. In this same general area, 1/7 continued to block the valley to the southwest while holding Hill 1276, of South Ridge, about 2500 yards south of the village.
“The question of whether we should make these movements during daylight or at night was a difficult one,” said Colonel Litzenberg. “We finally decided to make the movements in daylight when we could have advantage of observation for air cover and artillery. The movement, piecemeal by battalion, was successfully executed.”[510]
[510] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55.
The enemy took surprisingly little advantage of the readjustment. Movements were completed in an orderly and methodical manner as the units drew rations and ammunition for the breakout. Preparations were made for the destruction of all equipment which could not be carried out, and air drops of ammunition and other supplies were received.
As a solution for the problem of casualty evacuation, General Smith had suggested the construction of an OY strip. A start was made at 0900 on the 30th by the TD-18 dozers of Major McReynolds’ artillery battalion, but the area came under enemy fire the next day and the nearly completed strip could be used only twice.[511]
[511] Ibid., McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
Joint Planning for Breakout
The plan, as finally agreed upon, called for a combination of the two solutions. Since it was essential to relieve hard-pressed Fox Company and secure vital Toktong Pass prior to the arrival of the main column, one force would advance across country. And since it would have been physically impossible to carry the wounded over the mountains, the main body would fight its way along the road to Toktong Pass.[512]