(b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis to close the Hamhung area.
(c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni, protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the Division through Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area.[551]
[551] 1stMarDiv OpnO 25-50, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv AdmO 20-50, 4 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec 50; Smith, Chronicle, 104–106.
All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators, casualties and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to march on foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security. It was directed that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the side of the road and destroyed if not operative by the time the column passed. During halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be established.
Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions to clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were planned by the Division Engineer Officer.
Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed that the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days, equally distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and the following provision was made for ammunition:
On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle, minimum 1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps depleted or transportation capacity exceeded.
Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated in vehicles of the column.
Two Division trains were set up by AdminO 20-50. Lieutenant Colonel Banks commanded Train No. 1, under RCT-7; and No. 2, under RCT-5, was in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne. Each motor serial in the trains was to have a commander who maintained radio communication with the train commander.
Truck transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment at Hagaru, a Division destruction plan was issued on 4 December, making unit commanders responsible for disposing of all excess supplies and equipment within their own areas. “Commanding officer 1st Regulating Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies and equipment remaining in dumps,” the order continued. “Unit commanders and CO 1st Regulating Detachment report types and amounts of supplies and equipment to this headquarters (G-4) prior to destruction. Permission to use fuel and ammunition for destruction purposes must be obtained from this headquarters (G-4).”