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1Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines[4]
2Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division, October-December 1950[12], [122]
3Wonsan and Harbor[16]
4Kojo Area[47]
5Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan[62]
6Majon-ni Perimeter[64]
7The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division[97]
8Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase[101]
9Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November[111]
10Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass[115]
111st Marine Division Zone and Objectives[130]
12Yudam-ni[153]
13Marine Attacks, 27 November[155]
14Battle of Northwest Ridge[162]
15Action at 3/5’s CP[169]
16The Battle of North Ridge[173]
17Hagaru Defensive Perimeter[199]
18East Hill Attacks, 29 November[212]
19Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December[223]
20Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December[227]
21Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November[230]
22East Hill Attacks, 30 November[237]
23Breaking off Action, 30 November[252]
24Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December[256]
25Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December[269]
26Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December[289]
27Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December[292]
28Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December[295]
29Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December[310]
30Hungnam Docks and Beaches[344]

CHAPTER I
Problems Of Victory

Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel—Surrender Message to NKPA Forces—MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity—Logistical Problems of Advance—Naval Missions Prescribed—X Corps Relieved at Seoul—Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing

It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was brought home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN) heads, both political and military, during the last week of September 1950. Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in Korea, as represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).

Only a month before, such a result would have seemed a faint and unrealistic hope. Late in August the hard-pressed Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) was defending that southeast corner of the peninsula known as the Pusan Perimeter.

“Nothing fails like success,” runs a cynical French proverb, and the truth of this adage was demonstrated militarily when the dangerously over-extended NKPA forces paid the penalty of their tenuous supply line on 15 September 1950. That was the date of the X Corps amphibious assault at Inchon, with the 1st Marine Division as landing force spearheading the advance on Seoul.

X Corps was the strategic anvil of a combined operation as the Eighth Army jumped off next day to hammer its way out of the Pusan Perimeter and pound northward toward Seoul. When elements of the two UN forces met just south of the Republic of Korea (ROK) capital on 26 September, the routed NKPA remnants were left only the hope of escaping northward across the 38th parallel.[1]

[1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the Inchon-Seoul operation.

The bold strategic plan leading up to this victory—one of the most decisive ever won by U. S. land, sea and air forces—was largely the concept of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, who was Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CinCUNC) as well as U. S. Commander in Chief in the Far East (CinCFE). It was singularly appropriate, therefore, that he should have returned the political control of the battle-scarred ROK capital to President Syngman Rhee on 29 September. Marine officers who witnessed the ceremony have never forgotten the moving spectacle of the American general and the fiery Korean patriot, both past their 70th birthdays, as they stood together under the shell-shattered skylight of the Government Palace.[2]