This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions relieving the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be known to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the dispatch of the iron elephants.[161]
[161] Col T. L. Ridge, Notes on Operations in North Korea, 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, Notes) and comments on preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, The New Breed (New York, 1952), 203.
MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSAN
A Ambush of 2 Nov 50
B Ambush of 3 Nov 50
C Ambush of 7 Nov 50
D Ambush of 12 Nov 50
E Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50
MAP-5
The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They were being traveled extensively at this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military effort.
It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more than 15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such an important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni.[162] Thus the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s reinforced battalion were sent as a blocking and screening force.
[162] Smith, Notes, 393–394; G-3 SAR, 5–6.