North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care indicated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon as practicable.
I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.[11]
[11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in EUSAK War Diary (WD), 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
The surrender broadcast evoked no direct reply from Kim Il Sung, Premier of North Korea and Commander in Chief of the NKPA. Instead, the reaction of the Communist bloc came ominously from another quarter. Two days after MacArthur’s proclamation, Red China’s Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai informed K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, that China would intervene in the event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. He added, however, that such action would not be forthcoming if only ROK troops entered North Korea.[12]
[12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct 50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 361–362. The information was forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that he had never been informed of it. Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter MacArthur Hearings), 109.
It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September permitted operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea....”[13] In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s plans for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high among the United Nations at this time, and CinCUNC shortly received supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS—the one establishing legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the other reaffirming military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7 October, the United Nations directed that
[13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, Memoirs, II, 360; Whitney, MacArthur, 397. Italics supplied.
All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the Sovereign State of Korea....[14]
[14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in Guide to the UN in Korea, 20.
Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur could attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea militarily and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows: