U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such treatment. The answer was that they couldn’t help themselves. The Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained them after the NKPA collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under the thumb of political commissars holding life and death authority over them. Any NKPA soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty or escape was certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the firing line had a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the system had none.
This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when NKPA troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions. Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red with more tenacity on the defensive.
Because of the stubborn NKPA opposition in East Korea, the Eighth Army staff and command gave some thought to the possibility of an amphibious operation in the enemy’s rear by the 1st Marine Division. Plans were discussed on 28 May for a landing at Tongchon ([Map 8]). The Marines were to drive southward along the Tongchon-Kumhwa road to link up with the IX Corps units attacking toward the northeast along the same route. After meeting, the two forces would systematically destroy the pocketed enemy units. It was decided that 6 June would be D-day. And then, to the great disappointment of Generals Thomas and Almond, the plan was suddenly cancelled by EUSAK on 29 May after a single day’s consideration.[211]
[211] EUSAK Cmd Rpt, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA (Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58.
Another scheme for cutting off large enemy forces was abandoned on 28 May when the 187th Airborne got as far as Inje. Most of the CCF units having escaped, this regiment was given a new mission of securing the high ground to the north of Inje.
During the last five days of May the 5th and 7th Marines continued to advance steadily. On the morning of the 31st the 7th faced the task of breaking through a stubbornly contested pass leading into Yanggu. With a battalion on each ridge leading into the pass, Colonel Nickerson found it a slow yet precarious prelude to get the men down. Adding to their trials were some 500 enemy 76mm and mortar shells received by the regiment.
General Van Fleet, an onlooker while visiting the 7th Marines OP, shook his head wonderingly. “How did you ever get the men up those cliffs?” he asked Colonel Nickerson.
The answer was short and simple. “General,” said the regimental commander, “they climbed.”
As the day wore on, Nickerson called for what his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Davis, described as “a through-the-middle play. A company of tanks [Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Captain Richard M. Taylor] was launched up the road with infantry on foot hugging the protective cover of the steep road embankments. As the tanks drew fire, the infantry could spot the source and ... quickly cleaned the enemy out. This rapid thrust caused the enemy defenders to flee as fire was poured into them from our center force as well as the flank attackers.”[212]
[212] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; HDs for 1stMarDiv, 5thMar and 7thMar for May 51.