Raymond Cartier, representing a Paris newspaper, probably spoke for most of the correspondents at the front when he suspected that the proposal for truce talks “was possibly just a crafty trick devised by the Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled Chinese armies.”[242]
[242] UN World, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10.
It might have been recalled at this time that the Communists had used truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese Civil War. In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Nationalist victory were bright, the enemy took advantage of American peace efforts by agreeing on several occasions to meet for truce conferences. And while prolonging the talks by all manner of subterfuges, the Communists profited from the breathing spells by regrouping their forces and planning new offensives. Their final triumph, in fact, owed in no small measure to interludes when the conference table served a military purpose.[243]
[243] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series 30, pp. 352–363.
History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the next two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer weeks. Indeed, Admiral C. Turner Joy believed that the war was actually prolonged rather than shortened as a result of the negotiations.
“Military victory was not impossible nor even unusually difficult of achievement,” wrote the Senior Delegate and Chief of the UN Command delegation at the truce talks. “Elimination of the artificial restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military victory in less time than was expended on truce talks.”[244]
[244] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter Joy, How Communists Negotiate. One of Admiral Joy’s last services to his country before his death in 1956 was the writing of this book. Other sources for this section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., “Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea,” U.S. News and World Report, 23 Jan 1953, 35–36; E. Weintal, “What Happened at Kaesong and What is in Prospect,” Newsweek, 23 Jul 1951, 38; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
Mao Tse-tung’s forces had lost face by the failure of their long heralded 5th Phase Offensive. They had been badly beaten during the UN counteroffensive. Pretensions of high CCF morale could no longer be maintained when troops were laying down their arms without a fight. Nor could charges of low UN morale be supported when the fighting spirit of the Eighth Army was being shown every day at the front.
In view of these circumstances, it would appear that the Communists had poor cards to play against United Nations trumps at a truce conference. But they played them so craftily, with such a sly sense of propaganda values, that the victors of the May and June battles were soon made to appear losers begging for a breathing spell.
To begin with, the Chinese knew that the mere public announcement of the possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in the United States, where the war was unpopular. Pressure would be brought upon Washington to meet the enemy immediately for negotiations. And while a cease fire remained even a remote prospect, American public opinion would demand a slackening of offensive military operations with their attendant casualties.