At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7 companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took until 2025 for Nihart’s men to complete the relief after fighting for every foot of ground.
Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because of the danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds and Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six enemy bunkers. The 4.2″ mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 28 WP rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing mine fields.
Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night, and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300 enemy. Colonel Wornham’s regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14 September. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and automatic weapons fire.
NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749, where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling 3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat trajectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were directed against NKPA bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029 rounds.
The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 48 hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action took a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The principal fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a heavy artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. The assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective BAKER yet remained to be secured.
The Marines could not help paying reluctant tribute to the skill as well as obstinacy of the NKPA defense. Enemy bunkers were so stoutly constructed that the North Koreans did not hesitate to direct well aimed mortar fire on their own positions when the Marines closed in for the final attack.
Nkpa fields of fire were laid out for the utmost effect. Marines with recent memories of college football referred to the enemy’s effective use of terrain as the “North Korean T Formation.” On Hill 749, for example, the main ridgeline leading to the summit was crossed by another wooded ridgeline at right angles. Attackers fighting their way up the leg of the “T” came under deadly crossfire from the head of the imaginary letter—a transverse ridgeline bristling with mortars and machine guns positioned in bunkers.
In accordance with Division OpnO 25-51, the 5th Marines (Colonel Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on 15 September in preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the attack. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in turn would relieve 1/1 (Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr.), so that it could pass through 2/1 and carry on the assault to complete the securing of Hill 749.
The KMCs and Division Recon Company were to relieve the 5th Marines of responsibility for the HAYS Line, while the 7th Marines remained in reserve at Wontong-ni.
The comparative quiet of the 15th was shattered a minute after midnight when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 2/1 off Hill 749. The NKPA hurricane barrage that preceded the attempt, according to the Division report, “reached an intensity that was estimated to surpass that of any barrage yet encountered by the 1st Marine Division in Korea.”[287]