Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La Hue’s 3/1 relieved two battalions of the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the ROKs had fought their way to the summit of Hill 854, the ridgeline to the southwest remained in the enemy’s hands. An attack by 3/1 was planned for 1530 on 20 September, supported by artillery and an air strike. Delays in the arrival of the planes caused a postponement until 1720. How Company jumped off and had advanced 50 yards when a man was killed and another wounded by mines. The attack was called off at dusk so that the ROKs could remove the explosives they had planted.
Air support was requested for 0700 on the morning of the 21st, but it was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived for a strike directed by an observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air controller. At 1220, following a 10-minute artillery preparation, How Company spearpointed a battalion attack which met stiff resistance. Another air strike was requested but did not materialize. The assault continued with mortar and artillery support until 1745, when How Company reported the ridge line secured.
Casualties of 3/1 for the two days were nine KIA and 55 WIA. Enemy losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA, and 29 prisoners.[304]
[304] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1 historical diaries for September 1951.
“A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the battalion sector,” the 3/1 report for the 23d concluded, “most of these being U.S. types which were placed by ROK troops, with only a few enemy mines scattered in the central portion of the sector.”[305]
[305] 3/1 HD, Sep 51, 8.
Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884
Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines to extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of the 11th Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances this would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving troops merely to climb Hill 884 ([Map 20]), The position was accessible only on foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores.
Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a reconnaissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission to the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop lift by helicopter.
He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft. Large-scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage.