(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and Uisong.[35]
[35] EUSAK msg GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51.
Based on these directives. Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 on the 9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, plus other Division elements, were ordered to provide the required trucks.[36]
[36] 1stMarDiv OpnO 1-51, 9 Jan 51.
General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 9 January. He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, where the Division staff officers and regimental commanders were presented to him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnaissance and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Marine officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth Army units would be put into effect soon.[37]
[37] Smith, Notes, 1279.
Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan to the objective area.[38]
[38] 1stMarDiv OpnO 2-51, 10 Jan 51.
Shortages both of personnel and equipment were much reduced during the first two weeks of January. Returns to duty of battle and nonbattle casualties added 945 to the Division strength. Corresponding improvements had been made in the material readiness of the Division. Early in January a large resupply shipment arrived from Kobe, and a Navy cargo ship brought supplies and equipment which had been left behind at Inchon in October. Thus the situation was generally satisfactory except for nearly 1,900 gaps in the ranks that remained to be filled.[39]
[39] Smith, Notes, 1285–1286, 1307–1308.