The Move to the Chungju Area—Marine Planes in Action—Planning for the New Operation—The Jump-Off on 21 February—Stiffening of Chinese Resistance—General Smith in Command of IX Corps—The Advance to Phase Line ARIZONA—JOC Air Control System Criticized
The CCF counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 11 February 1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure exerted during the previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice beaten during a recent six-week period and pushed back some 200 miles, EUSAK had shown amazing powers of recuperation.
“It is hard for me to put into words the magnificent competence, the fierce, combative, aggressive spirit of that force once it picked itself off the ground and waded back into the fight,” commented General Ridgway in retrospect.[79]
[79] Ridgway, Memoirs, 216.
During Operations THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP he had kept a tight rein on the Eighth Army by insisting on vigorous artillery preparations and close lateral contacts between units. On 10 February, however, caution was relaxed as CCF resistance suddenly collapsed west and south of Seoul, That day the U.S. 24th Infantry Division forged ahead 11,000 yards to occupy the port of Inchon and Kimpo Airfield, both so wrecked that weeks of repair would be necessary to make them operational. Seoul was within sight of the U.S. forces on the left bank of the Han when an aroused enemy struck back on the subzero night of the 11th.
Apparently the CCF drive on the central front had as its objective the relieving of UN pressure on the Seoul area to the west. The CCF 40th and 66th Armies and NKPA V Corps struck in the IX Corps sector north of Hoengsong ([Map 6]). Two ROK divisions being dislodged by the initial blows, their retreat made necessary the withdrawal of other IX Corps units. As a consequence, Hoengsong had to be abandoned on 12 February to the Communists hammering out a salient northeast of Wonju.[80]
[80] IX Corps Cmd Rpt, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51; Smith, Notes, 1462–1465.
The UN forces were not bound by any unrealistic concept of holding ground to the last ditch. General Ridgway deemed it more important to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy at a minimum cost in casualties. While fighting on the defensive, he had already made up his mind to launch an offensive of his own to catch the Chinese off balance the moment their counterattack ground to a halt. His new limited objective operation emphasized the destruction of the enemy’s fighting strength as the major objective rather than the acquisition of territory. A high attrition rate would preclude the Communists’ capacity to hold and enable EUSAK commander to recover the critical hill mass north of Wonju. It was for this purpose, he informed Major General Bryant E. Moore, IX Corps commanding general, that the 1st Marine Division would be employed.
“The force which holds Wonju,” he said, “has the situation in hand.”[81]
[81] EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Feb 51, Sec I, 52. Comments by Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.