This conference did much to clear up the situation. On 5 March no less than 48 Marine sorties reported to DEVASTATE BAKER, though there was little need for them in mopping-up operations. And during the next two weeks an average of 40 sorties a day was maintained.
CHAPTER V
Operation Ripper
Light Resistance the First Day—Seoul Abandoned by Enemy—Second Phase of the Operation—Changes in 1st MAW Units—General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion—1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division—38th Parallel Recrossed by Marines—Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems
The new IX corps commander, Major General William H. Hoge, USA, arrived at Yoju on 4 March 1951. He relieved General Smith the next day and a color guard turned out to render honors to the Marine commander when he returned by helicopter to his own Division CP. Upon Smith’s arrival, General Puller resumed his former duties as ADC.
The jumpoff of the new operation was scheduled for 0800 on 7 March, so little time remained for last-minute preparations. The basic plan called for the drive of IX and X Corps toward the 38th Parallel on the central front. Protection was to be given on the left flank by I Corps in the area south and east of Seoul. On the right the ROK divisions had the mission of maintaining lateral security with a limited northward advance.
It was no secret that General Ridgway had been disappointed in the numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation KILLER. The primary purpose of RIPPER was to inflict as many Communist casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure to keep the enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A secondary purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that city and the river Imjin, thus compelling the enemy to choose between default and a defense on unfavorable terms.[118]
[118] EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Mar 51.
CCF strategy in the early spring of 1951 was obviously conditioned by preparations for a third great offensive. The enemy’s emphasis on caution is shown in a translation of a CCF training directive of this period:
There must absolutely be no hasty or impatient attitude toward warfare. Consequently, even though we have a thorough knowledge of the enemy situation and the terrain, if one day is disadvantageous for us to engage in combat, it should be done the next day; if day fighting is disadvantageous, fighting should be conducted at night, and if engagements in a certain terrain are not to our advantage, another location should be selected for combat engagement. When the enemy is concentrated and a weak point is difficult to find, one must be created (by agitating or confusing them in some way), or wait until the enemy is deploying. Engagements must be conducted only when the situation is entirely to our advantage.[119]