On the morning of 8 April an opportunity arose for the Marine jets to help the 7th Marines. It started when 3/7 patrols encountered 120mm mortars, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades employed by an enemy force dug in on a ridge looming over the road near the west end of the Hwachon reservoir. The battalion forward air controller radioed DEVASTATE BAKER at Hongchon for air support.[148]
[148] The following description is from: 7th Mar HD, 8 Apr 51, 5; IX Corps Cmd Rpt, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574 and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7) “Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW HD, Apr 51, App VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr.
At the time Major Roy R. Hewitt, an air officer on General Shepherd’s FMFPac staff, was visiting the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2). His blow-by-blow report of events is as follows:
a. At 0900 a request for an air support strike on an enemy mortar position was received from the 7th Marines. It took the Air Support Section until 0945 to get through to JOC and then it had to be shunted through K-1 in order to get the request in.
b. The G-3 1st Marine Air Wing had arranged with JOC to have four (4) F9F ‘scramble alert’ for use by the 1st Marine Division. The F9Fs were requested, and JOC authorized their use, but when Marine Aircraft Group-33 was contacted they informed the Air Support Section that JOC had already scrambled the aircraft and sent them to another target.
c. Air Support Section again contacted JOC, and JOC said aircraft would be on station in one (1) hour. At the end of one (1) hour JOC was again contacted concerning aircraft. This time JOC said they would have two (2) flights on station within one (1) hour. At the end of the second one (1) hour period no aircraft were received.
d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed that any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be requested through the 1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC notified DEVASTATE BAKER that any such requests from the 1st Marine Division would not be honored until the Division went back into action.][149]
[149] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, op. cit.
During all this time ten Marine planes—six from VMF-311 and four from VMF-214—had reported in and out of the area. They had been sent by MELLOW to work under the control of Mosquito STRATEGY, the tactical air controller (airborne) (TACA) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flights also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the Marines’ left, hit troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines’ front, and aided the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were encountering resistance on the commanding ground to the right. None of the flights supported the Marines.
Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the enemy positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of four Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt’s report continued: