To counter the impending ground attack, at 1859 Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki ordered Captain McLaughlin’s Company A forward to reinforce the Hook sector and to assist Company C in containing the enemy attack. One platoon, the 1st, departed immediately for the MLR. As the remainder of the company prepared to move out, the enemy struck in estimated battalion strength. By 1938 some of the CCF infantry had advanced to the main trenches immediately south of the Hook. Within a few minutes, a second wave of Communist soldiers, following closely the preparatory barrages, hit JAMESTOWN just east of the 1/7 salient and frontally at the Hook itself. It appeared that the Communists had come to stay, for many cargo carriers—Chinese with construction materials for bunkers and trenches—accompanied the attacking infantry.
Fire fights raged during the early phase of the struggle, with continuous support furnished the assault troops by Chinese artillery and mortars. The momentum of the enemy’s three-pronged attack, aided by heavy rear area fire support, enabled the Chinese to overrun the trenches and push on along the crest of the ridge, its slope near the spine, and across the segments formed by the spurs that jutted south from the crest. Marine defenders pulled back while a small rear guard covered their movement with fire. Along the MLR, about 400 yards south of the Hook, the Chinese had slipped around the flanks of the COP and at 2030 forced a penetration in the C/1/7 line. Second Lieutenant John W. Meikle (1st Platoon, Company C) organized the Marines into a perimeter defense adjacent to the MLR. At 2130, remaining elements of the company formed another defense blocking area 550 yards east of the Hook near the crest of the ridge.
Between these two positions small groups of Marines continued the heavy close fight to repulse the enemy while inching their way forward to tie-in with the rest of the unit. (See [Map 17] for penetration limits during the Hook battle.) To the northeast, the platoon at Warsaw had not been heard from since 1945, and at 2330, Colonel Moore reluctantly declared the outpost to be in enemy hands.
At the time the loss of Warsaw was announced, counter-measures designed to halt the enemy assault were in various stages of preparation or completion. The initial reinforcing element sent forward to strengthen the main line had linked up with Lieutenant Meikle’s 1st Platoon, Company C, in the perimeter near the 3d Battalion boundary. The remainder of Company A was en route to the crest of the east-west ridge to thwart what appeared to be the main enemy drive. Colonel Moore had released his meager reserve, H/3/7, at 0300 on the 27th, and General Pollock had ordered one of the division reserve battalions, 3/1, to the 7th Marines area, although still retaining operational control of the unit.
As the forward battalion of the division reserve, 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Altman) had prepared counterattack plans for critical locations in the division sector and had previously made a reconnaissance of the Hook area. The battalion immediately displaced from its bivouac site north of the Imjin (Camp Rose) to an assembly area behind the 7th Marines on the MLR.
MAP 17 K. White
HOOK PENETRATIONS
26–27 October 1952
All possible support for 1/7 was made available, since the critical situation resulting from the major enemy assault automatically suspended previous restrictions on use of artillery and mortar allowances. At Warsaw, 2/11 blanketed the position with a continuous barrage in order to limit the enemy’s ability to effectively hold and consolidate the captured COP. Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ cannoneers also blasted enemy formations in response to fire missions from forward observers. Artillery rounds fell on Chinese outposts supporting the attack, on approach routes to the battleground, on assembly areas, and on known and suspected Chinese artillery locations.