Spurred on by the leadership of Lieutenant O’Brien, who later received the Medal of Honor,[283] the company was able to execute a limited advance. Despite the heavy artillery and mortar fire, the company drove a wedge into the Communist position, thereby retaking the initiative from the enemy. Company H also took three prisoners in the southeast end of the Hook before being forced by a deadly enemy mortar and artillery barrage to withdraw upridge.
[283] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.” Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position. Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and get more ammunition.
When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend they were dead; during the next three hours several different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile, shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File)
The attack by Company H had been well supported from the air. At 0840, a flight of four ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s VMA-121 assaulted the former Marine COP Seattle, where enemy reinforcements were being funneled through on the way to the Hook. Bombs and napalm took a heavy toll of the troops, bunkers, and weapons pouring fire on the counterattacking Marines. One hour later, a division (four planes) from VMA-323 struck another trouble spot, a former Marine outpost known as Irene (later, Rome). Aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain’s squadron hit this objective with three tons of bombs and more than 4,000 pounds of burning napalm. Thirty minutes later, another foursome, these from VMA-212, (Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dobson, Jr.),[284] delivered bombs, napalm, and 20mm shells on enemy soldiers moving on the MSR towards JAMESTOWN.
[284] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This flight was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook forces that the new commanding officer participated in that day.
While these three squadrons were bombing enemy strongpoints and other targets of opportunity, division artillery and tanks continued their destructive fire missions. Between 0930 and 1300, two tanks from Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, blasted away at Chinese bunkers and trenches, at an enemy 76mm gun on Seattle, and at positions southwest of the Hook. Artillery—2/11, 4/11, and the rocket battery—contributed the weight of its support. The 11th Marines, in an effort to stop the heavy hostile shelling of the Hook sector, fired 60 counterbattery missions on Chinese gun emplacements during the first 24 hours of the attack.
In the early afternoon of the 27th, 1st MAW attack squadrons continued their bombing and strafing of enemy troops engaged in the assault against the Hook. Before sundown, 30 aircraft had taken part in 8 additional strikes in support of Marine counterattacks along the ridge. The number of aircraft involved in close air support sorties for the Hook was approximately half the number received by the division all day. Of the 72 aircraft flying CAS strikes during the first 24 hours of the Hook action, 67 were Marine planes, all from MAG-12.
As in the morning’s close air support flights, Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s ADs provided the bulk of air support for ground action that afternoon. Striking first a command post southeast of the 1/7 salient, at 1410, VMA-121 came back a half-hour later with four more Skyraiders against CCF troops pressing to envelop the right flank of the counterattack force. At 1635, two squadron aircraft flew in quickly in response to a sighting of troops moving forward in the Samichon tributary 1,000 yards north of the Hook. Twenty minutes after this successful attack, four more Skyraiders attacked bunkers opposite the left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector. The final daylight strike for 1/7 was again made by four ADs from -121. These planes took under attack a target that had been bombarded just 25 minutes earlier by Corsairs from VMA-323.
Another Marine attack squadron, VMA-212, participated in the Hook support that afternoon. At 1344, a four-plane flight assaulted troops moving through Frisco to reinforce the Chinese drive on the Hook. Two of the planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs and two 250-pounders on the enemy soldiers. The other pair of attack Corsairs released six 780-pound napalm tanks over the position. It was estimated that 25 Chinese casualties resulted from this air attack. Wrapping up the VMA-212 CAS for the Hook sector on the 27th was a strike, at 1440, on camouflaged positions and another at 1520 against caves and bunkers. Each of these air assaults took place about 950 yards from the Hook. The earlier one was a napalm attack from 50 feet above the ground. One of the six tanks would not release and three did not ignite. Four caves were destroyed and one bunker was damaged in the latter strikes.
Between the morning and afternoon air strikes, the ground commanders put together the final plans for recapture and defense of the Hook. When General Pollock had released I/3/1 to the regiment during an inspection trip to the 1/7 area that morning, the company was already en route to the ridge to make the counterattack. The ground commanders agreed that after I/3/1 regained the salient, H/3/1 would take over the right sector of 1/7 and the relieved company, B/1/7, would then occupy both the critical MLR sector and Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s scheme to recapture the positions and ground lost on 26 October was a continuation of the attack from atop the ridge directly towards the objective. It was to be a hard-nosed, frontal assault, but the only maneuver deemed advisable.