MAG-12—Colonel George S. Bowman, Jr. vice Colonel Condon on 13 January;
MAG-33—Colonel Louis B. Robertshaw succeeded Colonel Herbert Williamson on 22 October.
1st MAW Operations 1952–1953[316]
[316] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: PacFlt Eval Rpts No. 5, Chap. 9 and No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Oct 52, Jan-Feb 53; MAG-12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar 53; MAG-33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan-Mar 53; VMA-121 ComdDs, Nov-Dec 52, VMF-115 ComdDs, Nov-Dec 52; VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Oct 52-Jan 53; HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov-Dec 52, Jan 53; Futrell, USAF, Korea; Montross, SkyCav.
The heavy ground fighting across the Eighth Army front in October 1952 had drawn heavily upon units of the 1st MAW. That month Marine pilots logged their greatest number of sorties—3,897—since June 1951.[317] As a result of the intense infantry action in the 1st Marine Division sector another air record was established—365 casualty evacuations by HMR-161 during October. This was a peak number to that time for the helicopter transport squadron for which med evac was a secondary mission. These “mercy missions” were not limited only to wounded Marine infantrymen or downed aviators.
[317] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443 for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52.
Whenever and wherever immediate air rescue was needed, the choppers were sent. In July 1952, HMR-161 evacuated “650 Army and Air Force troops as well as 150 Koreans”[318] from a flooded river island. On the night of 18 January 1953, a helicopter retrieved five Marines from an uncharted minefield after one of the group had accidentally stepped on a mine. On 13 March, HMR-161 sent three helicopters aloft in an attempt to save five men from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion who had become trapped in mud near the edge of the Imjin, and later that month the squadron dispatched a chopper to rescue a hunter marooned in the middle of the Han River.
[318] Montross, SkyCav, p. 189.
Almost obscured in the magnificent record of the mercy missions, especially the hazardous casualty evacuations by the VMO-6 pilots, were the problems encountered by the observation and helicopter squadrons. Under operational control of the division and administrative control of the wing, the squadrons found themselves exposed to overlapping command authority which sometimes resulted in conflicting directives from higher headquarters. Some squadron personnel felt that establishment of a helicopter group under the 1st MAW might have solved many of the organizational problems, but such a unit was never established in Korea, partly because only one helicopter squadron (plus half of the observation squadron) existed.
Another organizational difficulty beset VMO-6. With two types of aircraft and two unrelated missions (med evac for the HTL and HO5S copters; observation and artillery spotting for its little OYs and, later, OE-1s), the squadron found supply and maintenance problems doubled and operational control of its rotary and fixed wing sections extremely complex. Attachment of the VMO-6 choppers (for evacuation, administrative, and liaison missions) to HMR-161 was suggested as a possible solution to these difficulties, but was never done.