Concluding his after-action report of CLAMBAKE, the regimental commander, Colonel Walt, observed:
In addition to inflicting large numbers of casualties and destruction upon the enemy, the operation served a secondary purpose, none the less important. It provided excellent training and experience for the various infantry and supporting arms staffs involved, helping to develop them into a smoothly functioning infantry-air-artillery-tank team.[346]
[346] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3.
Shortly before the end of the month, the 5th Marines made another major assault. As in the earlier CLAMBAKE, this raid was again in two-reinforced-platoon size and made during the early daylight hours of 25 February. This time the objective was a single height, Hill 15 (Detroit), two miles east of the CLAMBAKE objective. Lieutenant Colonel Oscar F. Peatross’[347] 2/5, manning the extreme right sector of the division, gave the assignment to Company F, then under Captain Harold D. Kurth, Jr. Planning for Operation CHARLIE, a standard-type kill, capture, and destroy raid, was carried out in much the same detailed manner as the earlier 1/5 raid.
[347] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52.
Charlie differed somewhat in concept in that the 2/5 operational plan attempted to gain surprise by launching the attack during the BMNT[348] period as well as in use of smoke to screen enemy observation. Supporting arms preparatory fires had been carefully plotted, including the precision destruction aerial bombing that had proved so effective in the CLAMBAKE assault. In actual execution of CHARLIE, however, bad weather prevented the use of almost all the planned pre-D-Day and D-Day air strikes. Upon reaching the Detroit objective area assault Marines “found the majority of enemy installations were relatively undamaged, even though subjected to heavy bombardment by other supporting arms.”[349] Artillery preparatory fires had been employed successfully to isolate the battle area and howitzer and tank missions supported the raid.[350]
[348] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to approximately 300 yards.
[349] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5.
[350] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds. Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of this raid, 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53.
Between the time of CLAMBAKE and CHARLIE a series of Marine and enemy small units actions erupted which were soon to become a way of life for the MLR combatants. By sporadic outpost attacks and increasing their use of artillery, the Chinese were beginning to demonstrate a more aggressive attitude than in recent months. On the night of 12–13 February, a CCF platoon supported by mortars and artillery probed COP Hedy (Hill 124), in the right battalion of the center regimental sector, held by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett’s 3/7. On the next night, it was the Korean Marines who turned aggressor. Two of their platoons raided Hill 240, on the west bank of the Sachon, nearly three miles north of the mouth of the river. The following night, a 7th Marines patrol moving into ambush positions was itself stalked by a large CCF patrol. When reinforcements, including armored vehicles, moved out from the MLR to support the Marines, the Chinese hastily withdrew.