During the period other organizational changes included transfer of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-33 to MAG-12.[449] The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters, moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns with F3D-2s was also completed in early June.
[449] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B. Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel Bowman to the States.
Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes: the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be deactivated, effective 1 July.
The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre- and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953:
[450] See [Chapter VI].
[451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one half miles long.” PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-67.
The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining 1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These overlays are important for making up target maps for close support missions, but they are continually held up for long periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are then often too old to be considered reliable.[452]
[452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.
Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312 shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454]
[453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.