(3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector.
Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of all military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ within 72 hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications within the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour deadline. It subsequently became evident, however, that it would be impossible to complete the entire job of dismantling and salvaging MLR fortifications within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953, CinCUNC had advised major commands that Communist and UNC negotiators had agreed to extend the original 72 hours to an additional 45-day period, or until 13 September.[649]
[649] Other modifications and deadline extensions included: (a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the 38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only through those ports of entry specified in the armistice agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
Division order 1MARD-OP-11-53, issued at 1600 on 27 July, clearly stated that all “removable materials”[650] would be taken out of the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the effective date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war order further directed that division personnel would “locate and list all valuable materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this prescribed time ... an additional period of 45 days, after the initial 72-hour period, will be used to complete salvage operations within the Demilitarized Zone under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission....”[651]
[650] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice MBP 1MARD-OP-11-53-July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53.
[651] Ibid.
From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communications seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders. At the pick and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes to the effect of:
Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of here. If unable to salvage; then destroy.... No word was passed that there would be a period following the truce in which we could conduct a thorough salvage operation. Had this information been available, a more systematic process could have been devised....[652]
[652] Co H Rpt, op. cit., p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
One regiment commented “that early directives from higher authorities did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage operations.”[653] More specifically, 1/7 related: