[659] Ibid.
Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12 timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to 16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress a demolition program of such magnitude.
In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills, however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the generally prevailing situation.
Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program “basic equipment was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity.”[660] Effective on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many “jury-rigged” levers or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The “Korean Sling Method,” with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped with winches and wreckers were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement. Division engineers experimented at some length with three different ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams were secured to columns with two-feet spikes. The least technical approach which involved “winching the bunkers out of their positions and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the most successful and the quickest method.”[661]
[660] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.
[661] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were allowed “ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through the darkness.”[662] During this three-day period alone, the 1st Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks.
[662] Co G Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3 August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized gear that could be construed as “combat equipment.” The 2½-ton trucks, however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport operations.
By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the division reserve.