Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted 1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.
Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another. And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped by the heavy rains.
With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161 operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support, combat helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They had introduced a new infantry technique of “hit and run” tactics. The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral component of the modern-day balanced military force.
FMF and Readiness Posture[719]
[719] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), 1951–1955; PacFlt EvalRpts No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6. Chaps. 9, 10; USMC Board Rpt, vs. 1-11; Generals’ Summary; Brochure titled “Historical Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1941–1950 (Preliminary),” held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951 (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), hereafter Giusti, Mobilization, MCR; USMC Ops Korea, vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve—A History, 1916–1966 (Washington: Division of Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, “Men of Color,” issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).
The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279 officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac included 7,779 men in General Smith’s 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately 8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.
Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and effectively. In fact, “few achievements in the long history of the Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon.”[720]
[720] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941–1950, p. 49.
As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked. With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459, less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,[721] its reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.
[721] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even “had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division.” Giusti, Mobilization, MCR, p. 9.