[770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields—their own, as well as the enemy’s.
[771] Batterton, Korea Notes, p. 34.
In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity in intelligence activities.
The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:
Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches, and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.
For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.
An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack within a short period.[772]
[772] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.
As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of established procedures: