Guns of the 1st Tank Battalion immediately began to render valuable support to Marine frontline regiments with the division’s new assignment in the west. Companies A, B, and C were placed in direct support of the three forward infantry regiments. Company D drew the reserve mission, which included tank-infantry training with the 7th Marines and preparation for reinforcing division artillery fires. Tank companies were used almost daily in the forward sectors for destruction by direct fire of the Chinese MLR fortifications. For such missions the M-46 tanks, equipped with high-velocity 90mm guns, lumbered forward from secure assembly areas to the rear of JAMESTOWN to temporary firing positions on the line.
After pouring direct fire on preselected targets and completion of the fire mission, the armored vehicles then returned to the rear. Less frequently, a five-vehicle tank platoon accompanied a reinforced rifle platoon and conducted daylight reconnaissance missions of forward areas to engage the Chinese and to gain intelligence about enemy positions and terrain. During April six such tank-infantry patrols, all in the KMC regimental area, failed to establish direct contact with the enemy but did draw mortar and artillery fire.
Marine artillery, which had been receiving its share of attention from Communist field guns,[61] was faced by problems in two other respects. Although the enemy held only four more artillery weapons than did the Marines, General Seiden still lacked the ability to mass artillery fires to the same degree as did the Chinese.[62] This limitation stemmed directly from the wide physical separation of 11th Marines batteries and the frontline infantry regiments being supported. A second problem, the loss of qualified forward observers—reserve officers due to return to the States for release from active service—forced the 11th Marines to begin a school to train infantry officers for this function. To make the course realistic, all firing was done at live targets.[63]
[61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese counterfire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army 8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese defensive positions, generally brought down on their own emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. Pala comments.
[62] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-39.
[63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66, hereafter Henderson ltr II.
In April 1952, the 11th Marines organization had three light 105mm howitzer battalions (54 guns), one medium 155mm howitzer battalion (12 guns), the KMC 105mm howitzer battalion (18 pieces), and a 4.5-inch rocket battery (6 launchers). Attached to the 1st Marine Division and located in its sector were one battalion and one battery of the I Corps field artillery. The mission of the Marine artillery regiment was to provide accurate and timely fires in support of both the MLR and OPLR defenses, until withdrawal of the latter late in April. Batteries of the 11th Marines also fired on known and suspected Chinese gun emplacements and on targets of opportunity. The regiment also provided intelligence on enemy artillery.
Throughout April, Colonel Henderson’s units continued to improve their tactical and administrative areas, concentrating on field fortifications, wire communications, and road trafficability. In the last category, the artillery dozers and dump trucks not only did nearly all of this work for the 11th Marines but also provided “a fair amount of ‘direct support’ bulldozing to the infantry regiments and occasionally loaned dozers and operators to the engineers.”[64]
[64] Ibid.
Within a Marine aircraft wing, personnel and equipment for logistic support are purposely limited to carrying out the wing primary mission—providing air support during an amphibious operation. The wing T/O (Table of Organization) provides a streamlined organization with light, transportable organic equipment. Additional logistical support personnel and equipment are not included since this would result in (1) a duplication of support effort between the wing and landing force and (2) a great increase in wing transport shipping requirements. When the wing moves ashore, organic units render support necessary for operations on the airfield only. Responsibility for activities beyond this basic mission—airfield construction, maintenance of runways, and movement of supplies to the airfield—must come from more senior commands. Usually such assistance is obtained by attaching elements of a naval construction battalion and other logistical support units.