[67] Ibid., p. 10-68. Flights were not made in heavy fog. Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development cycle.
Different Area, Different Problem[68]
[68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53, Subj: Type “C” Rpt: “Civilian Affairs and the Korean Service Corps, Mar 52-May 53,” hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv ltr, Civ Afrs and KSC; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.
An additional responsibility the 1st Marine Division inherited when it moved to western Korea was control of civilians within the division boundary. In eastern Korea, all nonmilitary personnel had been evacuated from the vicinity of the MINNESOTA Line in the division sector; they had not been removed from the JAMESTOWN area. Prior to the arrival of the division in the west, the STAYBACK Line, averaging seven miles to the rear of the Imjin River and running in a generally northeast-southwest direction, had been established to limit the movement of civilian personnel in the forward areas. The Marines soon found that their predecessors must have been lax, however, in requiring that Korean civilians remain behind STAYBACK. What seemed equally unsuitable to the division was the poor military-civilian relationship that had apparently existed for some time.
To correct the situation, General Selden cautioned his units to avoid unnecessary damage or destruction to the civilian economy. He directed his commanding officers to keep unauthorized Koreans away from Marine installations. Military police set up check points and instituted roving patrols to enforce division controls. Civil violators were turned over to Korean authorities or held for investigation before release. Civilians who lived in the forward areas were removed to the rear. They were prevented from going beyond STAYBACK until August 1952, when a controlled passage system was instituted.
CHAPTER II
Defending the Line
UN Command Activities—Defense of West and East Coast Korean Islands—Marine Air Operations—Spring 1952 on JAMESTOWN—End of the Second Year of War—A Long Fourth of July—Changes in the Lineup—Replacement and Rotation—Logistical Operations, Summer 1952
UN Command Activities[69]
[69] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank A. Manson, USN, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson, Sea War, Korea; James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington: [Div. of Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, NavOps, Korea; John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret E. Tackley, Korea, 1951–1953 (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, Korea, 1951–1953.