Close air support of ground troops remained an almost forgotten mission of Fifth Air Force tactical aircraft. When planes were allotted for close support, both their customary late arrival over the target area and pilot inefficiency left Marine ground commanders less than satisfied.[81] The particular concern of General Jerome, the new 1st MAW commander, was the continuing limited opportunity for his Marines to execute their normal primary mission—close air support of frontline troops. Although FAF assigned Marine pilots to support the 1st Marine Division whenever possible, the infrequent number of close air support missions performed under the existing sortie limit was beginning to detract from the quality of delivery. General Jerome set out to remedy this unfavorable situation.
[81] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, p. 10-45.
Working with General Selden, the Marine wing commander prevailed upon the Air Force to permit close air support training of wing pilots and of forward air controllers with the Marine division. On 19 May, CG, FAF lifted the close air support restriction that he had imposed in front of General Selden’s MLR. By agreement between the FAF and the two Marine commanders, Fifth Air Force would permit the scheduling of 12 close air support sorties daily for a one-month period, MAG-12 was given this training mission, to begin on 21 May.[82]
[82] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training pilots in close air support techniques.... Initially, all training missions for this division were flown by Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum for pd 1 Jan-30 Apr 52, cited in PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, p. 10-196. These flights ceased just before the ones from MAG-12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the new close air support training program, has credited the two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter McGill comments.
The objective of the CAS program, in addition to providing operational training and practice for Marine ground officers, air controllers, and pilots, was to inflict maximum casualties on Chinese troops and to increase the destruction and damage to their positions. Before assigning a pilot to the actual training flights, MAG-12 sent him on a tour of the front lines to become better familiarized with the topography, the restricted (“no-fly”) areas, and probable enemy targets. Air strikes requested by the division went directly to MAG-12. Initially, a limitation of 12 sorties per day was established, but on 17 July—the program having already been extended beyond its original 30-day limit—a new ceiling of 20 daily sorties went into effect. The division was also allowed additional flights above this prescribed daily sortie number when air support was needed to repel a large-scale enemy attack or to assist in a major Marine ground assault.
Almost as soon as the Marines began to derive the benefit of the training program, the flights were terminated by FAF. On 3 August 1952, following a complaint by CG, Eighth Army that Marines were getting a disproportionate share of the close air support sorties, the Fifth Air Force notified General Jerome that the special program would end the next day. General Selden was instructed to request air support “in the same manner as other divisions on the Army front.”[83] Despite the abrupt termination of the training program, the division had derived substantial benefits from the 12 weeks of Marine-type close air support. “Air attacks were the most useful weapon for dealing with enemy dug-in on the reverse slopes,”[84] according to an official analysis. One regimental commander reported that the 1,000-pound bombs were effective in destroying enemy bunkers and further noted that the strikes had produced good results in the “destruction or damaging of enemy artillery and mortar pieces.”[85] Another senior officer commented that air overhead kept the Communists “buttoned up,” which permitted Marines greater freedom of movement for tactical and logistical operations.[86]
[83] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 8-54.
[84] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, p. 9-36.
[85] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.
[86] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.