Initiating the infantry action in May was the 1st KMC Regiment, holding the division left flank, with its 2d and 1st Battalions on line. At dusk on 3 May a platoon-size raiding party, under Second Lieutenant Kim Young Ha, left an outpost forward of the 1st Battalion line on a prisoner-taking mission and headed for the objective, Hill 34, adjacent to the rail line to Kaesong and about a half-mile west of the Sachon River. When the platoon was within approximately 1,000 yards of its goal, a support squad was detached near a trail and stream juncture to ambush any enemy attempting to attack the raiders from the rear.[123] The remainder of the platoon, two assault squads, then continued towards the objective, moving cautiously and halting for an hour because of the bright moonlight.
[123] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The heavy casualties it received prevented its further participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May 52.
After midnight the moon disappeared behind the clouds, and the Koreans again emerged. They advanced towards a village immediately south of the objective. After searching a few houses and not finding any enemy, the KMCs started on the last leg to Hill 34. As soon as the objective came into view the raiders deployed for the assault. At 0410 the two squads of Korean Marines charged the knoll, immediately drawing heavy Chinese small arms fire. When the raiders continued their assault, the enemy retreated to his trenchworks and bunkers where he continued to fire on the KMCs. Since it now appeared to the patrol leader that the probability of taking a prisoner was unlikely, he prepared to return to friendly lines. He first arranged for artillery to cover the withdrawal of the patrol, and then broke off the 18-minute fire fight, taking his only casualty, a wounded rifleman, with him. The KMCs counted 12 enemy dead. No prisoners were taken. In the preliminary action, the support squad had also suffered three killed and seven wounded.
As the KMC raiders were making their way back to the MLR, a combat patrol from 1/5, the reserve battalion of the 5th Marines, prepared to move out. This patrol was one of many dispatched by the battalion during the first week of May in accordance with its mission of patrolling in front of the OPLR, between the MLR and the OPLR, and throughout the regimental sector. On this occasion, the patrol was to occupy the high ground south of former Outpost 3, which had become the focal point of activity in the center sector.[124] When used as a base of fire, this ground provided a position from which automatic weapons could readily cover enemy lines or tie in with adjacent friendly defenses. In addition, the 1/5 patrol was to drop off friendly snipers to cover the former OPLR position, to maintain surveillance, and to ascertain to what extent the Chinese were developing the outpost. The task went to a Company A platoon, which the unit commander, First Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, reinforced with light and heavy machine guns.
[124] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along with several others had been abandoned when the division withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR.
At sunup the Marines crossed line JAMESTOWN and before 0900 had reached the high ground they were to occupy. Here the patrol leader set up his base of fire, then pushed on with the rest of his men to the outpost, receiving occasional mortar fire before reaching the old position. While organizing his men at the objective, Lieutenant Lee received word by radio that the Chinese were preparing to attack. Almost immediately, intense shelling struck the forward slope of the hill. A Marine aerial observer (AO) detected 60–70 Chinese advancing from the next hill, some 800 yards to the front of the Marines. The AO also reported that the enemy was firing mortars towards OP 3.
Shortly thereafter the Chinese fire ceased. Moments before it lifted, the patrol received a second warning that an enemy attack was imminent. Even as this message was being received, about 30 Chinese rushed the patrol. The Marines immediately took the hostile assault force under fire, killing 14 CCF with well-placed small arms fire. Overhead, four 1947-vintage Marine Corsair fighters (F4U-4Bs) struck at troublesome mortar positions previously located by the AO. At 1330 another aerial strike against Chinese mortars and enemy positions on the hill north of OP 3 was executed. These two air missions were credited with destroying six mortars, damaging two others, and wrecking seven personnel bunkers. During the second strike the 1/5 patrol began its withdrawal.
On two occasions during the patrol’s return to its base the enemy attempted to ambush it. Each time the attempt was thwarted, once by the patrol itself and the second time, with the help of friendly artillery. On the way back several loud explosions suddenly halted the patrol. Investigation revealed that the Marines, carrying their casualties of one dead and four wounded, had inadvertently stumbled onto a path not cleared of mines. Two members of the stretcher bearer detail were killed and three others wounded by the AP (anti-personnel) mines that had not been charted on friendly maps by the Marines’ predecessors in the defense sector. A mine clearance team promptly disposed of the danger. With the aid of fires from a 2/5 patrol on the nose of a nearby hill, the 1/5 platoon was able to break contact. After pulling back several hundred yards, the patrol reached a forward medical aid station where jeeps picked up the more seriously wounded and took them to helicopters, which completed the evacuation. Patrol members reported 27 known enemy dead, including one that had been propelled into the air by a direct hit from an artillery round.
The next major Marine ground action soon involved the same Company A platoon, but this time as part of a larger force. Colonel Culhane, the regimental commander, directed his 1st Battalion to launch a new raid on the Outpost 3 area in an attempt to oust the Chinese and thereby deny the enemy use of the critical terrain. Inflicting casualties and capturing prisoners were additional tasks assigned. On 8 May Lieutenant Colonel Nihart issued Operation Order 12-52, calling for 1/5 to seize a series of three intermediate objectives (S, V and X) en route to OP 3 (Y). (See [Map 8].) The combat patrol, reinforced by regimental elements, less Company B, was to be prepared to move north of OP 3 to occupy the next hill mass (Z), if necessary.
