[149] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.
Fundamental to the tank problem was a shortage of the M-46 itself. At the training facility, Training and Replacement Command, Camp Pendleton, M-46 engines had been available for maintenance instruction but no tanks for the training of gunners and drivers.[150] General Hart pointed out this deficiency to the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. On 13 August the Commandant directed the transfer of five tanks to the training installation from the 7th Tank Battalion,[151] also located at Camp Pendleton. At the same time General Shepherd ordered an increase in the school quota for tank crewmen. The first graduates would not reach the division in Korea, however, until the November draft.
[150] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).
[151] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Encl (35).
The presence of not fully trained personnel in a combat zone was not limited to the division. In the summer and fall of 1952, a large number of volunteer reservists, both pilots and enlisted replacements with little experience since the end of World War II, joined the 1st MAW. It had not been possible for the Stateside training and tactical squadrons, themselves short of personnel and aircraft, to qualify all pilots as combat ready. It fell upon the wing in Korea, therefore, to take the needed corrective action. The more experienced 1st MAW pilots, after completing their combat missions, flew instructional flights to help prepare the rusty fliers. Some reserve pilots, away from regular daily flying since 1945, found the adjustment too difficult and turned in their wings. MACG-2 operated “Pohang U,” a training course for forward air controllers. In practically every squadron, there were shortages of electronics personnel. Jet squadrons found mechanics hard to come by. There were never enough motor transport replacements. For unqualified enlisted Marines, squadrons operated on-the-job training programs.
To maintain a reasonable degree of unit proficiency, the wing limited the monthly turnover of pilots to 25 percent. Like the division, the wing employed split tours between an officer’s primary duty and staff work to broaden his experience. In some cases the amount of time required by administrative work as compared to a pilot’s actual flying time reduced his proficiency in the air. In June, Task Force 95 reported that the proportionately large number of take-off and landing accidents on the carrier Bataan was caused by the rapid turnover of pilots and their need for frequent carrier qualification.[152]
[152] PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, p. 10-198.
A Marine pilot joining the wing could expect his assignment to last for 6 to 9 months. Personnel in a nonflight status had longer tours of 10 months to a year. Wing replacements were made on an individual basis, although there were plans that by mid-1953 a new policy of at least partial squadron replacement would be in effect. That 1st MAW squadrons were able to operate effectively on an individual replacement system was attributable to the peculiarity of combat conditions in Korea. Absence of real enemy aerial opposition permitted the use of basic, parade-type flight formations and non-tactical approaches and attacks. An unusually high-level of experienced pilots in each of the two wing groups helped in the establishment of training programs and operational doctrine. The FAF limitation of four aircraft per flight eliminated the problem of large-scale, precombat squadron training as well as the difficulty of controlling and coordinating a large number of planes in a strike.
Logistical Operations, Summer 1952[153]
[153] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Selden, Div Staff Rpt; PacFlt EvalRpts No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52.