[253] Communication with General Kendall’s I Corps consisted of radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane, and motor messenger. PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 8-68. The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of communication wire. Henderson ltr III.

In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone, and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks. With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October, the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition.

Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines was the focal point of the new effort.

CHAPTER V
The Hook

Before the Battle—Preparations for Attack and Defense—Attack on the Hook—Reno Demonstration—Counterattack—Overview

Before the Battle[254]

[254] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, Info for CG, FMFPac; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31 Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. memo to Dir, MarCorHist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes on 7th Marines’ Action (Defense of “The Hook”), 26–27 Oct 52, hereafter Heinl, memo.

After the heavy fighting in early October, there was a change in the 1st Marine Division dispositions. On the 12th, the 5th Marines relieved the 1st in the center sector and the latter regiment went into reserve. For the next two weeks the lull that prevailed across the regimental front was in sharp contrast to the intense fighting there earlier in the month. On the division left, the Korean Marines, not engaged in any sizable Communist action, conducted frequent tank-infantry reconnaissance patrols and ambushes forward of their MLR. In the center of the division line the 5th Marines, too, found their Chinese opponent seemingly reluctant to pursue any combat offensives, though his harassment of the Bunker Hill area represented the strongest action against the Marine division at this time. The 7th Marines, holding down the right sector, similarly encountered the enemy for only brief periods, these contacts during patrol actions lasting no more than 15 to 30 minutes.

Upon its relief from the MLR, the 1st Marines took over the division rear area. There the regiment continued the improvement of the secondary defensive lines, conducted extensive training, and dispatched numerous security patrols throughout the regimental area. These routine reserve roles were in addition to the primary mission of augmenting units on the Marine MLR in order to counterattack and defeat any attempted penetration of JAMESTOWN in the division area. As part of its counterattack mission, the divisional reserve regiment was to be prepared for employment anywhere in the I Corps sector to block an enemy advance.