“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.”
* * * * * *
“On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss.
“In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked ‘Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can have your independence a little longer’. The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen ‘I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny.’
“Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the ‘Grossdeutschum’ idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.” (1760-PS)
(b) Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program of Armed Preparedness. The wiles of von Papen represented only one part of the total program of the Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.
Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit discloses the following: The Nazi organization, weakened in the events following the putsch, began reorganization work. An informant furnished the Austrian Government with a memorandum of a meeting of Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria, September, 1934. The memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for new terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons cooperating with the Schuschnigg Government when the next action against the Government took place, and to appear disposed to negotiate but to arm for the struggle. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Mr. Messersmith. At the same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a continuing menace for Austria. (1760-PS)
The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria is corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis, Rainer (812-PS). (812-PS contains three parts. First there is a letter dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated 6 July 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.)
The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was asked to prepare a short history of the role of the party. He states that after the Anschluss Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart alone credit for effecting the Anschluss. It is Rainer’s belief that credit belongs to the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to “the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”.
Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer said, and wrote to Rainer asking for an explanation. To avoid misunderstanding, Rainer prepared for Seyss-Inquart a copy of his letter to Buerckel and his report.