Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address Hitler responded to Papen’s suggestion, asserting:
“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss”. (TC-26)
Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler announced, for a complexity of reasons, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been and continued to be to interfere in Austria’s internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.
(e) Temporary Continuance of a Quiet Pressure Policy. On 1 May 1936 Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow or the day after Germany would fall upon Austria. His words were published in the Voelkische-Beobachter, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (2367-PS)
If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria “tomorrow or the day after”. For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.
A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, called upon von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May 1936, recounts von Neurath’s explanation why Germany was trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria (L-150). The Nazis were growing stronger in Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young people. And the German Government was doing nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland, reoccupied two months before, had been “digested”, and until fortifications were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany wished to avoid any involvement with Italy.
(f) The agreement of 11 July 1936. But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points out, Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had embarked on her Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the refortification of the Rhineland, strengthened Germany’s position (1760-PS). This weakening of Austria helped pave the way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (TC-22)
The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, between the German Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria, looks like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria, in its policy, especially with regard to Germany, will regard herself as a German state. But the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria, and that it regards the inner political order of Austria (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal concern of Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.
But there was much more substance to the day’s events. Mr. Messersmith’s summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is more revealing:
“Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘national opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the Deutsche Nationaler into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister Without Portfolio”. (1760-PS)