“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:
‘* * * The major factor in the internal situation in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. * * * There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria. * * * The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.’
“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.
“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.
“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:
‘* * * Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.’ ” (2385-PS)
In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by those considerations alone. Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was willing to go to some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence. All these countries found it possible to believe apparently substantial personages, like von Neurath, for example. They were led to rely on the assurances given, which seemed more impressive since the diplomats making them were represented as men who were not Nazis and would not stoop to go along with the base designs of the Nazis.
Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and harped on fears of Communism and war.
In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High-ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit:
“High-ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas publicly.” (2385-PS)