“If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.
“For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises.
“Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.
“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air-attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)
“If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.
“In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)
“It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.
“I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these points.
“J [Jodl] 26/8.”
(388-PS, Item 17)