“General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.
“I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.
“In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
“1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).
“We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl), (X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o’clock). The ‘Y time’ has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.” (1780-PS)
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s minutes are Item 19 in his file (388-PS). In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:
“General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept, if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
“The Fuehrer: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
“General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.
“v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.” (388-PS, Item 19)