N. The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions.
With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in Berlin on 5 November 1937 (386-PS). This program of conquest had been intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders.
Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS, Item 10)
In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German government concerned with war production, read as follows:
“1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39 of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible. * * *” (R-133)
In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s conclusions as follows:
“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (2801-PS)
In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these words:
“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.”