The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case.
“Fuehrer does not give order yet for ‘W’ [Weser Exercise]. He is still looking for an excuse.” (1809-PS)
The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads:
“English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.’ ” (1809-PS)
The entry for 21 March reads:
“Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst’s Force, detailed to conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, and even exaggerate them.” (1809-PS)
The entry of 28 March reads:
“Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than advantages.
“In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces.” (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 April reads: