From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed either by Keitel or by Jodl. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. (TC-58)
The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows:
“1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town.
“2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force.” (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case ‘Yellow.’ ” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made this entry:
“Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” (1809-PS)
In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their neutrality.
At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was taken.
After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian report: