The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than five o’clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the ease of Holland the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of 28 October 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a three hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, also, both began in the small hours of 6 April 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler at five o’clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was bombed. In the case of Greece, it was at twenty minutes past five that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.
The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is, in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime: to attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage, and to proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. This is clearly the method of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own.
It is impossible not to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the “honest broker” himself or by his honest clerk, Ribbentrop.
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA
| Document | Description | Vol. | Page |
| Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 (a). | I | 5 | |
| International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V. | I | 27, 29 | |
| ————— | |||
| Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court. | |||
| ————— | |||
| *444-PS | Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116) | III | 403 |
| *448-PS | Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, concerning participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. (GB 118) | III | 413 |
| *1195-PS | Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for provisional directions for partition of Yugoslavia. (GB 144) | III | 838 |
| *1541-PS | Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December 1940. (GB 117) | IV | 101 |
| *1746-PS | Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) | IV | 272 |
| *1834-PS | Report on conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) | IV | 469 |
| *1835-PS | Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, 28 March 1941. (GB 126) | IV | 475 |
| *1842-PS | Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) | IV | 477 |
| *1871-PS | Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12 August 1939. (GB 142) | IV | 508 |
| *2450-PS | Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, as published in Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 26 March 1941. (GB 123) | V | 186 |
| 2719-PS | German assurance to Yugoslavia; official announcement by German Foreign Office, 28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic Representatives, published in Documents of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p. 324. | V | 378 |
| *2762-PS | Letter from Hitler to Mussolini (probably early November 1940). (GB 115) | V | 410 |
| *2765-PS | Extract from notes of conference between Hitler and Ciano in Vienna, 25 March 1941. (GB 124) | V | 411 |
| *2987-PS | Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA 166) | V | 689 |
| *3054-PS | “The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167) | V | 801 |
| *C-59 | Order signed by Warlimont for execution of operation “Marita”, 19 February 1941. (GB 121) | VI | 879 |
| *C-127 | Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler, 27 March 1941. (GB 125) | VI | 938 |
| *C-134 | Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on conference between German and Italian Generals on 19 January and subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 January 1941. (GB 119) | VI | 939 |
| C-147 | Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed by Hitler, 12 November 1940. | VI | 957 |
| *C-167 | Report of meeting between Raeder and Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) | VI | 977 |
| *L-79 | Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims”. (USA 27) | VII | 847 |
| *R-95 | Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30 March 1941, concerning deployment instructions for “Action 25” and supplementary instruction for action “Marita”. (GB 127) | VIII | 70 |
| TC-43 | German assurance to Yugoslavia, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p. 352. | VIII | 386 |
| *TC-77 | Memorandum of conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August 1939. (GB 48) | VIII | 516 |
| *TC-92 | Hitler’s address at dinner for Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, 1 June 1939. (GB 114) | VIII | 536 |
| *TC-93 | Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the German people, 6 April 1941, from Documents Concerning the Conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114) | VIII | 537 |
12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.
A. Inception of the Plan.