It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive.
C. Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa.
The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date:
“30 January 1941
7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces”. (C-35)
”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all:
“II. Objectives of War Against Russia.
* * * * * *
d. To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (C-35)