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“7. As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the ‘inner circle,’ than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.
“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical.” (C-66)
But the passage last quoted indicates that the other members of the General Staff favored “Barbarossa”. Raeder’s memorandum actually says substantially what Blomberg’s affidavit (3704-PS) says; that some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command Group took no stand against Hitler on “Barbarossa” and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have already been cited. (446-PS; C-35; 872-PS; C-78; 447-PS)
(f) Nature of the General Staff and High Command Group Responsibility for Aggression. The nature of the accusation against this Group for plotting and launching wars of aggression must be clearly understood. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused because they did the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make military plans and command troops.
It is among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences; to write notes and side memoires to the government to which he is accredited; and to cultivate good will toward the country he represents. Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to weigh and determine matters of national policy and to draft regulations and decrees and make speeches. Hess, Frick, and the other politician-defendants are not indicted for doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith but it is none the less a crime if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge against all the defendants, and against the General Staff and High Command Group as well. The charge is that in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage wars of aggression and in violation of Treaties.
The Charter (Article 6(a)) declares that wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances are crimes against peace. It is no defense for those who commit such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession, whether it is arms or the law. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, to carry out such plans and engage in war if in so doing they do not knowingly plan and wage illegal wars.
There might well be individual cases where drawing the line between legal and illegal conduct would involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But there can be no doubt as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group, nor as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the Group. The evidence is clear that these defendants, and the leaders of the Group, and most of the members of the Group, were fully advised in advance of the aggressive and illegal war plans, and carried them out with full knowledge that the wars were aggressive and in violation of treaties.
In the case of defendants Goering, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is constant. The same is true of the defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz is less voluminous, for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war, but his knowing participation in and advocacy of the Norwegian venture is clear.
Numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including its other leaders, participated knowingly and willfully in these illegal plans and wars. Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont the deputy to Jodl and chief repository of plans—in the nature of things these men knew all that was going on, and participated fully, as the evidence has shown. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von Schobert, together with Goering, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At later date, Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field knowingly prepared for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educated the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepted the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek had proposed that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland, and simultaneously assured Belgium that there was nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls foresaw at an early date that German policy was leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark was his brainchild; Krancke was one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt was in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certified the final orders for “Weseruebung” and a few months later proposed that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage. Most of these 19 officers were at the time members of the Group, and the few who were not subsequently became members. At the final planning and reporting conference for “Barbarossa,” 17 additional members were present. At the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.