Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936 you’re speaking of.’
Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’ ”
When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost importance in 1942, Goering explained that his preoccupation with the Air Force did not allow him the necessary concentration on the affairs of the Four-Year Plan, and stated:
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished. This task was to get Germany ready.”
These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that his chief task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was “to put the whole economy on a war footing within four years.” (EC-408) As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Goering was virtually the economic dictator for Germany with control over all other interested Reich agencies. He was the “boss of the economy,” and all important decisions had to be referred to him.
Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired and directed the preparation of the German economy for aggressive war. On 8 July 1938 he addressed a number of leading German aircraft manufacturers, explained the political situation, and laid the groundwork for a vast increase in aircraft production. After stating that war with Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the German air force was already superior in quality and quantity to the English, he continued:
“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only thing that matters is increased output regarding quantity and quality. Even if the manufacturers know that their present policies may mean their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to do it all the same * * * I want you to be perfectly resolved, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make their preparations for mobilization today, the less danger there will be of work being held up. It must be determined for every worker whether he is essential for production upon outbreak of war, and measures must be taken to secure his deferment in case of mobilization. (3441-PS). An executive will be put in charge to work on nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for mobilization day.” (R-140)
A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938, another conference was held in Goering’s office. He began with the statement that Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic armament program which would make insignificant all previous achievements. He indicated that he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to increase the speed of Army and Navy armament, and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then proposed a specific program designed to accomplish these ends. (1301-PS)
(e) Military Mobilization for War. In his dual role as Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, it was Goering’s function to develop the Luftwaffe to practical war strength. As early as March 1935 Goering frankly announced to the world that he was in the process of building a true military air force:
“After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers.” (2292-PS)